מאמרים
On the interaction between children with autism and a humanoid robot
A preliminary report on a tool for exiting autism
- Pablo E. Grosz Schwarz
ABSTRACT
On June 19th 2014, in Beit Issie Shapiro Institute in Raanana, Israel, there was a presentation of video images showing children with autism interacting with human beings and robots made ad-hoc for robot-child research. This article refers to three of these videos, which show how children with autism, in a controlled setting, interact with a robot and a human being mimicking a robot. The children’s
reactions reveal enhanced social and communication skills and explicit emotional expressiveness, which weren't seen previously. In one of the videos, a child was first exposed to a mime artist dressed like a human being, with whom he did not interact at all and behaved in an autistic way. Later, when the mime artist was dressed like a robot, the child interacted with it in a playful way.
A child that behaves autistically does not express his subjectivity, such as emotions, desires, and thoughts. On the other hand, the robot is a particular kind of being that behaves as if it has subjectivity, but does not. This article intends to explain in special and new psychoanalytic terms, why a setting that includes a child, a human being, and a humanoid robot or a human dressed like a robot, allows the child with autism to show his or her human subjectivity. When the child with autism is in the presence of a robot with humanoid appearance that mimics in a mechanical way human responses, and a trained human agent mediates their interaction, there is a new mental or psychic scene. This scene manifests a reality where the child reveals a psychological function that used to be obscured by autistic behavior. Now the humanoid robot is the one that functions as a thing and not a subject, allowing the child to emerge, at least temporarily, as a subject lacking autistic traits and expressing his inner world.
At the Beit Issie Shapiro Institute in Israel, on June 2014, in Israel at the presentation on videos that showed children diagnosed with autism interacting with robots. Dr. Ben Robins and the author met in person and initiated a dialogue that has led to the writing of this article. Pablo E. Grosz Schwarz is a psychoanalyst and clinical psychologist that was invited to the video presentation. Dr. Robins, the speaker at the conference, accompanied his talk with the videos discussed in this paper. He used these videos to answer the question: Why utilize robots in the hands of therapists or teachers when treating children with autism?
In this article I consider that a child acts autistically when he or she doesn't express himself fully as the subject of verbal or non-verbal language, nor of emotion nor fantasy in daily or experimental settings. For example, if a girl just repeats words, she is not expressing herself as the subject of what is said. However, if she's a subject in at least one of the criteria just defined, it would not be considered completely autistic behavior. If she met all criteria for the four parameters, it would be considered truly autistic behavior. The children were evaluated by the research team as expressing deficits in areas defined previously.
The following notes describe preliminary observations that could lead to future research. The robot`s characteristics in terms of behavior and appearance were specifically designed for the study and treatment of autism through interactions with these humanoid robots. The author refers here to three videos and describe briefly what is shown in them, as well as the details presented by Dr. Ben Robins to the audience. This is then followed by the analysis of the children’s behavior as seen in these videos.
FIRST VIDEO
A professional mime artist was presented to a child with autism in two conditions that varied his appearance (robot and human). The child was always accompanied by an adult that was in the room but not shown in the video, who is also part of the interaction taking place.
The mime artist who performed the theatrical robot and ordinary human role was a white male, 175 cm tall with average build. The "robotic" costume included a complete head cover, mask, shirt, gloves trousers socks and shoes – all painted in the same light gray color, without details at all except of two holes for the eyes. The ordinary human costume included brown shoes, dark trousers, an open brown jacket, and a light colorful shirt.
The experimental set-up of the trials in both scenarios was identical, i.e. they took place in the same room, and the mime artist performed an identical pre-scripted repertoire of movements in both conditions. He started with one minute of stillness, which was followed by closely mimicking the movements of a humanoid robot. (Robins, B., Dauthenhan K., Dubowsky J., 2006, pg. 485)
At the beginning, the child is exposed to the mime artist dressed as a person. In this condition, the child proceeds to act spontaneously by showing complete indifference and lack of interest, and does not seem to look at the mime artist dressed as a human. Finally, the child sits facing away from him, remains passive and continues to appear disinterested until the end of the scene.
One hour later on the same day, the child is exposed to the second condition at the same scene. The costume allows the mime artist to simulate being a robot with minimal human appearance, while exhibiting robotic features. The mime artist is standing in the same attitude he was previously when taking on the role of a human. In contrast with the attitude the child exhibited in the first condition, the child now approaches the mime artist dressed like a robot, interacts with him, speaks, and shows emotion. The child shows human, emotional, and verbal expressions. The boy looks happy, takes initiative when interacting, and proceeds with playful interest. This qualitative observation of this specific case coincides with the quantitative observations made by Dr. Robins's research team. The children in this study initiated interaction significantly more with the mime artist dressed as a robot than the same mime artist dressed as a person, in spite of doing the same movements in both conditions.
This case is included in a four cases research, described with detail in Robins B., Dauthenhan K., Dubowsky J., 2006.
SECOND VIDEO
The agents present in this video are a child-like small robot that is capable of producing basic facial expressions (i.e. happy, sad), a person (Dr. Robins), and a child diagnosed with autism. The robot is sitting at a table, gesticulates, opens and closes its arms as if signaling a hug, and follows other commands from the person controlling it, such having a happy/smiley or sad facial expression. This person also talks to the boy. During the interaction with the robot, we see the child showing emotion, he joyfully repeats the word “happy” when the robot's expressions are of happiness. This behavior shows the joyfulness evoked in the boy, which is a genuine subjective expression. There is also a conversation between the child and the human being who controls the robot. In this interaction, the boy doesn't show severe autistic traits, on the contrary, he is full of emotion, shows verbal behavior, and looks at the human interlocutor. The investigator Ben Robins informs the audience that these behaviors are not typical behavior of this child, who according to his teachers, often used to have emotional upsets and tantrums that at times required staff to hold him until he calmed down. An interview with the child's mother revealed that after the period of interaction with the robot, he started to verbally express his emotional state (i.e. happy, sad) as well as his mother's. This was the first time he had ever communicated his feeling to her.
THIRD VIDEO
A boy interacts with a robot and the person that manipulates it. While doing so, he expresses emotion and acts in ways he had not shown before. In spite of previously not showing communication, language, observation and interest capabilities, the child now tries to get the human's attention and then points his finger towards the skylight at a bird he sees that catches his attention, and whispers: “what’s that?”. He does this while he interacts with the human being with whom he forms a triad boy-robot-human. The child used language to communicate with the experimenter for the first time in the six weeks he was participating in the interactive experience.
Analysis of the Three Videos
Ben Robins indicates to the audience that these new communicative and emotional behaviors are the usual reactions of children with autism participating in this project when presented with a robot. In this article, I am not referring in a generalized way to those children with autism that respond to the robot's appearance by showing verbal, emotional, and gesticulatory interactive behavior. This is observed while the child is interacting with the robot and human, and contrasts with their habitual autistic behavior. I am not saying that this occurs in all cases, because this would require systematic observations of this type of interactions. Thus I am referring here to the cases in which the interaction child-human agent-robot has led to the evident observation of subjective expression by the child with autism.
In the three videos, when children diagnosed with autism are in the presence of an interactive robot or a robot-like human being, they show a gesticulatory and emotional expression capacity that is relatively normal (non-autistic) or at least qualitatively better than those seen and expected in children with autism. Before these interactions, the children's emotional and communicative capacities were latent and un-manifested. In this article I will attempt to explain why they can express higher functioning after interacting with a humanoid robot.
The key to understanding the scenes in the videos is to consider the expression of language as coming from a human subject who is a subject that inhabits a linguistic web (Lacan, 1964). He inhabits this web even before having the ability to speak and regardless of ability. From a linguistic perspective, the child with autism fails to manifest his potential to be a subject. He is closer to being an object than a subject, when compared with a child without autism. We don't know if a child with autism can't be a subject, we only know that if he is capable, he isn't manifesting it. He doesn't manifest himself as the subject of his emotions or volitions and, when he expresses emotions, they are like mechanical action of the body without a subject. The echolalia is an example of speech expression where there is no subject manifestation, but rather a repetition of words that haven't been internalized. The child echoes the words of another, sometimes without understanding their meaning.
In the video scenes there are always at least three protagonists, even if they are not always seen on screen: the child, the humanoid robot (true or mimicked by a mime artist), and the human that interacts with the child and manipulates or controls the real robot. On the other hand, there is the element of the camera that permits us to be observers of what occurs. I will refer here to the real robot only, but what I will say also holds true to the robot mimicked by the artist.
When facing a humanoid robot that is an object and not a subject, the child manifests as the subject of emotions and speech capabilities. In these scenes where the humanoid robot is introduced and the child expresses subjectivity as a subject, the robot has taken the autistic role. This change of roles (the robot being autistic) has a variable: the humanoid machine is an entity that appears to be a subject, but is not. It speaks programmed words, can repeat words but cannot converse properly, and is unable to express authentic desires. The robot is part of a scene where there is simulation, particularly the simulation of a subject. Thus when the child drops the role of being autistic or, shall we rather say, the autistic role leaves the child, he is able to manifest itself as a child with desires, expression, and communication. He is invited by the scene to express himself as a subject, and does this spontaneously and without awareness of it. In contrast, before this experience, the scene without the robot does not normally evoke the subject within the child.
From the point of view of the psychological scene of play, we deduce that the particular cybernetic experience observed in these videos, shows that in the world of a child with autism there has to be "someone" that is an object that doesn't show itself as a subject. This could be the unknown cause of each case of autism or the unresolved x cause of all occurrences. If we take into account that the child with autism has robotic traits, echolalia, lack of initiative, and high dependence on external agents, then the child is replaced by the robot in the scene unconsciously represented.
Why should it be that the scene in reality has to have an autistic person or a replacement?
At the beginning the child's world is made of his or her parents. It is obvious that the first object the child identifies is the mother in the form of her breast, which he depends on for his physical and psychic existence (Sigmund Freud, 1905, Melanie Klein, 1988). In other words, in his perceptual world, the mother-breast is the world. Without doubt, the father is also important, not only if he feeds the baby, but I won't address this topic here. For the child, the mother is the world and he will attribute hunger and food to the mother-breast. Melanie Klein's psychoanalytic approach has developed the topic into the bad breast (the one that deprives, for example, food) and the good breast (the one that provides the food). What is interesting to consider is that for the baby there is no absent mother-breast, so if the mother is not present, the child's unconscious scene is one where the mother-breast is present but not giving, thus creating the ill feeling that is hunger. This is why we say that for the baby there is no world outside of the mother and the same goes for child locked into his autism.
Let's go a step further, if the child is in a subjective psychic scene where the world beyond the mother is veiled, then he does not perceive fully outside of the mother nor comprehend that there is a world beyond, leading to consequences in his interactions with the real world. The people that watch these videos or read this article, are able to perceive or imagine the world. In contrast, the world the child perceives has an equal structure to his closed psychic world. He has no dialogue or dialectic with the world, and is incapable of opening to what is beyond the mother. We will return to this idea as I try to explain how a child with autism unexpectedly comes out of autism, at least temporarily, when interacting in a triad robot-human being-child. To do so let's briefly consider the fact that in the world the child is in, he does not express himself as a subject.
Every child is an object of his mother, an object of her desires, and a psychic object that psychoanalysis has studied (Lacan, Freud). The child is an object that fills the void the mother has and satisfies her lifelong desire of having a baby that comes from her body. In a benign case, the baby will be the center of attention of the mother and probably the father, which is referred by Freud (1914) as “her majesty the baby”. It is good that the child is the object of the mother's love, desire and interest, but it's not good for the autonomy of the child to stay as her object. It is also not good to be a concrete object or thing of the mother, especially if this continues over time. We are aware that the word “object” has lost its metaphoric meaning and has become more like a “thing”, without expressing its meaning as an object of love, desire, hate, hopes, fulfilled or unfulfilled promises, and so on. The child with autism only expresses itself as an object, and the words that describe him emphasize him being an object, without stating what he is an object of.
With the assistance of the videos and the difference it makes to have the robot in the scene, we are able to decipher and conclude that it is necessary that someone manifests as a thing (the child with autism) or is replaced by a thing that manifests as “someone” (the robot), which has no real subjective expression. The formula that needs to be satisfied is one in which the child functions as a thing or the thing is almost someone. The child is similar to the robot in being an object-subject and his identification with robot could play a role. This similarity comes for the ambiguity that exists in the scale from object to subject. Because in the scene there was a robot that is a thing that is programmed to imitate something human, there was an unveiling, replacement or change of the child's role.
If he can do this, it means that the difficulty that held the child back is not physical or neurological, and can be overcome by the role changes in the scene. Maybe there still is an unsurmountable cause of autism that cannot be overcome even temporarily, but maybe not. We don't know in advance if the child is able to step out partially or completely from autism. In our minds, it is important to leave space for doubt and an openness to the possibility that “maybe it's not irreversible”, because otherwise we will be creating our own mental scene that “it is impossible to overcome”. This, in turn, will affect the upbringing, interactions and perceptions of the child and her circumstances.
Empirically we know that when a child with autism is in the company of other children with autism and their contact is mediated by other adults, she/he does not manifest subjective capabilities, in other words there is no emergence from autism. Because the humanoid robot in these experiments has a quality of being an object, a thing and a programmed machine (something the child is not), there is a passing of the baton between child and robot. We should ask ourselves, why isn't another child with autism able function as the robot? In terms of our reasoning, maybe it is because the other child has a degree of subjectivity that the robot does not possess or the robot responds to stimuli in ways that the child with autism doesn't.
The robot and child co-exist in a conceptual zone where the continuum subject-object is fused. In this zone, the child with autism is like a child who has been unconsciously "dressed up" as a robot and the robot is dressed as a human being.
This cybernetic experience and at least some cases psychoanalytically approached (Jerusalinsky, 1984, 2003 pp. 23-26) show that there might be partial or complete way out of autism, and that if we explore various therapeutic ways, we can discredit the belief that there is no partial or complete way out. The cybernetic trick permits the child to manifest as the subject of his experience and is a linguistic operation because it operates over the subject.
I doubt that solely interacting with a robot will be enough for the child to emerge completely as a subject. There is an unconscious theme that needs to be untangled through the intentional words of a human being, which is not limited by the sensory plane and has human complexity. Actually, the experiences described in this article happened through Ben Robins's therapeutic interventions and were mediated by his clinical knowledge. We have seen that what helps the child to express his hidden subjectivity is the robot and the agent that is between the child and the robot. The videos convey a potential that will impact parents and specialists by allowing them to imagine the child coming out of his autism. To imagine a healthier scene in the mother-child mind can change the equation the child follows, where he is almost an object. It is also important what mental scene the specialist imagines for the future of the child. The prognosis and tests used will have an impact on the child's performance and could lock in the limitations which the child could otherwise have emerged from. (Grosz, 2009)
In psychoanalytical terms, we interpret these cases as the child with autism being the “object” that the mother is missing in an overly concrete way. For the mother of the child with autism and to the extent possible, he is an object in a more concrete way, and has a minimized expression of a being a subject. More than the object of the mother's interest, the child has become an object per se. This is equal to saying that in autism the child is not an “object” in a metaphoric sense, but rather an object in an overly real sense (linguistically, instead of being a metaphor, it is a metonymy of the word “object”). In the case of an autistic child (but not always the case), a woman needs a child and then it is as if someone gave her exactly what she needed: an object. This is not due to an intrinsic fault in the mother because, as a woman lacking something, she will probably have children without autism. But in the case of the mental scene that is created for these children at birth or when conceived, the mother is completed by a child with autism. Of course this is not what the mother wants, but it has crystalized into the response she's received: a child with autism.
So, a child with autism is a concrete interpretation of the child being an object of motherly love and not a metaphor, such as in the case of a mother that wants the child. This would apply to the case of a mother that wants the child. One could question, who is reading it in this way? Who interprets it as needing a child object that does not manifest as a subject? Is the child that reads this? Or is it the mother? Our answer is that it is done by the one that puts up the scene, not a concrete person. Metaphorically, I say that it is the unconscious director of the scene. It's a mental scene that has everyone captive. The child's autistic games, repeated without change, create a conviction that there is no way out of autism.
There are mothers that express the child as an object in various ways, such as having them tied up to a leash as if he was a yoyo that should not escape, or by prohibiting exiting the home and limiting interactions with others.
In this way, autism does not depend on the mother's conscious will, as she wished for the positive development of the child. It is an issue that pertains to a metaphorical level that is different in each circumstance and leads to an unconscious linguistic process that produces a thing and not a subjective child. For example, if in the woman's psychic world and in a particular context, it had been said about the child “what a beautiful thing”, this may lead to an unconscious process producing a child-thing in an almost literal way.
From a linguistic perspective, the cure for autism comes from the emergence of the occult subject. Psychoanalysis finds another way, by getting help from the father who acts as a third person for the mother and child. This idea is described in detail by Lacanian Psychoanalysis and I will not develop this idea here.
The issue of subjects and objects I am addressing here pertains to language. When there is no expression of the grammatical subject, there also is no subjective expression of emotion nor unconscious fantasy. If a girl has echolalia, she does not express the subject behind the words. If her subjectivity emerges, as we observe in the experiences with robots, it could be because the subject is occult but not eliminated.
I should also consider another possible cause for the child with autism manifesting subjectivity in front of a robot and the human agent that mediates them:
Some professionals observing these videos during the presentation said that the child expressed his communicative facet because the robot is not threatening. The following is our analysis of this.
Someone could suppose that in the experiments on video, the child can express himself as a subject while in the presence and action of a robot because humans inhibit him. In this hypothesis human beings, including the mother, are threatening and thus lead to an autistic inhibition observed in all human interactions. Also the robot is less threatening because its behavior is more predictable than with humans. The hypothesis of humans being threatening while the robot isn't, is contradicted by the fact that in the scene there is a third entity that is human. Here the child does not show inhibition and does not act in an autistic way with the man. This discards this hypothesis.
The children observed in the videos are able to differentiate between person and robot, and they speak to the human specifically when in the triad human-robot-child. So the reason the child comes out of autism, definitely or temporarily, is not that he is not threatened by the robot. The supposedly threatening human is not threatening to him. This means that what impedes the child in becoming a subject is not the threatening presence of humans. Moreover, the child is not inhibited but rather programmed in a more or less reversible way to act autistically and this behavior is not a psychological defense. I suppose that in each case there is a limit on to how reversible autism can be, as there may be remains of autism that can fluctuate between none to minimal, compared with their current level. This is not approachable from the three videos and would require a long process.
About the child's interest in the window, which is a hole in the room's ceiling:
At the beginning, for every child the world is the mother (or the undifferentiated unit father-mother or its substitutes, which I will call mother too). For the child with autism, the mother is the world, she is everything. At a certain stage, most children would have found a metaphoric “perforation” in the world-mother and start to sense that there is a world beyond. For the psyche of a child with autism, there is no world outside of the mother. The psychic scene that contains the child with autism, is a cloistered world where he doesn't see himself as a subject. This is witnessed by his apparent autonomy which is expressed by his withdrawal from the world, and generalized disinterest, except for things that move (such as a spinning object, which he identifies with and imitates). The world is closed and he is locked in it. But now, in the accepted interaction with the robot, he is allowed to be a child and, at least momentarily, come out of autism and perceive with interest the bird he sees outside of the skylight, and speaks for the first time in 6 weeks in the laboratory. Would there exist another metaphor as beautiful and poetic as this one? As the child shows expression and communication and emerges as a subject, there is an opening of the exit door of autism, and he then points at a living thing beyond the enclosure he was in. He asks questions and talks to the man that moves the robot and is the interlocutor between them. He shows him what he sees: a hole in the world that permits us access to what happens in the unconscious world, and a hole in the mother-world that had been sealed previously. The communication and social interaction taking place are contingent with this opening and the emergence of the subject are part of that operation.
In psychoanalytic terms, the child with autism becomes the mother's non-transitional object. In other words, the boy is not a temporary object but rather a permanent object that serves as a “perfect” seal to the hole made by what the mother was lacking and, in spite of herself, cannot let go of. On the contrary, the child that does expresses his subjectivity and is a subject, is no longer a concrete object of the mother and becomes instead, the mother's child. Jacques Lacan, French Psychoanalyst, commented on Winnicott's concept of transitional object by stating that it's an object in the world, such as a piece of cloth that the child inverts in a libidinal way (Winnicot W.D , 1971). Lacan presents a problem that is derived from the opposite: what kind of object of the mother is the child? The psychic problem for the child's autonomy is in not being the mother's transitional object, but rather the mother's permanent object. “What is important is not that the transitional object preserves the child's autonomy, but rather if the child serves or not as the mother's transitional object” (Lacan, 2012).
The case of a mother and her child with autism, is just like the case of a child and his transitional object, where he stays tied to his pacifier, blanket or favorite toy. Even though every mother of a child with autism would ask for her child to move in the world and communicate, there is something happening between mother and child that stops this. It could be the child's mental image of the mother, or the mother mental image of the child, or the space between both. Therefore, the children that we have seen come out of their autism, even if temporarily, in triple interaction with the robot clearly show that autism is completely reversible and that, in general terms, there is a way out of it. It will still need to be seen if this is true in all cases, but I think it is possible because each time we see a child with autism manifested as a subject, even if momentarily, we know the potential exists. Maybe it is a transitional phenomenon that can be expanded to be complete.
Sometimes we don't know how to bring the child to have contact with others or to show his or her subjectivity, so instead of recognizing that we didn't know how to, we soothe ourselves falsely by assuming there is no way out of autism, not even partial. No one has to affirm there is no way out, but only that she or he has not seen it or read about the treated cases, such as those using the psychoanalytic approach.
In cybernetic terms, these experiences allow us to suggest that a robot is a frustrated attempt to program a machine with human form to have subjectivity and speech, while a child with autism is programmed unconsciously by a mental space mother-child to act like a humanoid robot without its own speech or subjectivity. Within the interaction between the robot and child that is mediated by an agent, there is a change of roles in the autistic child's imaginary scene, which allows him to act like a child with subjectivity.
The autistic child is a simulation of a robot, while the robot is a simulation of a child or human. In the game of mirrors involving the child and robot, the boy becomes a child in the world and the world opens up to him, becoming broader than the mother.
On the other hand, those institutions for children with autism that organize their activities under the assumption that autism has no cure, are determining through their actions a program that creates the lack of an exit for autism because it is based on a wrong forecast. They are programed for autism, and not to exit it.
Conclusions
Before presenting the conclusions in a concise way, some comments concerning the context of the experiment are added in order to support the conclusions:
- The conclusions drawn from the experiment shown in the three videos focus on the use of a humanoid robot. In a previous research project, the complexity of the expression and the appearance of the robot have been studied. (Wainer, Robins, Dautenhahn, Amirabdollahian 2013)
- The analysis of the present study refers to the presence of an interactive robot accompanied by a therapist. The quality of expression of the child and not its quantity is the main topic of this study. The fact that the child shows a new expression of subjectivity once, is sufficient in order to establish its condition as a non-autistic child and thus the existence of its capacity.
- The analysis and its conclusions are valid for robots whose function is that of a, however partial, relief. The robot as a relief for the child is verified through the observation that the child has adopted non-autistic expressions. The robot substitutes the autistic child in the psychic role of autistic behavior during the experiment and if the child improved his expressions later, beyond that situation, it means a significative mental change had been reached.
- The presence of the therapist is indispensable in order to obtain a satisfactory result. The therapist is the actor/spectator of the beginnings of the subjective, emotional, verbal and non-verbal expressions of the child, being “the other” who the child relates to and with whom it shares the experience, rather than with the robot.
- It has to be highlighted that the child is not inhibited by the complexity of the appearance of the therapist. As it had previously been assumed and concluded, that the complexity of the human appearance inhibits the child interactions and expressions (Robins et al. 2013).
- The idea of stressing the importance of the role of the therapist is complementary to the suggestion that for an autistic child, in the framework of this type of experiments, the contact with the experimenter provide meaning and significance to mere mechanical interactions with a robot (Robins, Dickerson, Stribling, Dautenhahn 2004).
These are my conclusions
- The experiences shown in the three videos discussed reveal that, when the child with autism is in the presence of a robot with humanoid appearance that mimics human responses, and a trained human agent mediates their interaction, there might be a new mental or psychic scene. This scene manifests a reality where the child reveals a psychological function that used to be obscured by autistic behavior. Now the humanoid robot is the one that functions as a thing and not a subject, allowing the child to emerge as a subject lacking autistic features, at least temporarily.
- The robot takes on the function of replacing the child with autism in a better way than another child with autism would. The presence of a child with autism is not enough to make the child act as a subject. Everyday observations show that children with autism don't spontaneously become subjects when in the presence of other children showing autistic behavior, which contrasts with the observations analyzed here.
- The child's enriched emotional interaction and subjectivity expression while relating to the robot and human agent, is not caused by the humanoid not being threatening. The child is also interacting with a human agent in the scene with the robot, so if humans were threatening to the child he would be inhibited.
- The children in the videos have the potential to exit autism.
- The child with autism that shows autistic manifestations is satisfying a psycho-linguistic function of playing the role of being a thing or object (instead of a child). This is the result of the child not being able to be an object of his mother's love in a metaphorical sense, but is instead a concrete object. In psychoanalytic Lacanian terms, the child takes place for a metonymic object instead of being a metaphoric object of his mother's love. Because of this, he is an object of hers and her body.
- The child is a metonymic object of the mother, in other words, he is functioning autistically by being a concrete lid that allows his mother to not lack anything and, in the child's perspective, doesn't need any other objects beside him. This correlates to his lack of subjective manifestation and perception of the world as something interesting that is separate from the mother.
- The new interest the child has towards something that is an opening (the window and what is beyond and the bird) shows that, psycho-linguistically, he has stopped playing the role of an object intended to cover the interest mother-child have for the world that is beyond the mother-child. The later having an equivalent as world-object.
- First there was a unity between mother-child that was equivalent to the unity world-object and accompanied the unity subject-object and the expression of verbal and emotional language. Later there would be an unfolding of folded things, the dialectical pairs that have been fuzzed before (such as subject-object, mother-child, and even father-mother) become unglued, and there is a perforation of sealed holes and a topological change of the structure of the unconscious.
Discussions and suggestions
This is the preliminary work based on the observation of three videos that permit the formulation of a theoretical explanation about what is occurring in the unconscious mental world of the child with autism. It was necessary to introduce tools of analysis that allow to decipher the unknown in the experiences discussed here, namely why an autistic child expresses capacity for non-autistic behavior while interacting with two characters: the robot and an agent trained in working with children with autism. The next research phase requires the observation and analysis of other experiences that may or may not confirm the analysis in this text. Nevertheless, I present these ideas as valid in the case of the children that respond in non-autistic ways. It would be interesting to research if the interaction robot-child-agent has the capacity to help exit autism in a generalized tendency and is observed in a high percentage of cases, or only in certain ones.
When studying the child as an agent with subjectivity, it cannot be done by using standardized research or using identical and invariable measurements in different children, because the goal is to evoke the particular subjectivity of each child and not treat him as an object that is expected to respond in a standardized or categorized way. When the child responds to the robot by showing subjective expression and is removed from autism, the interaction that allows this is mediated by an agent that interacts with the child by adapting each circumstance to him and the child responds to this tailored interaction in a particular way. If children are treated as objects of a standardized investigation or interact with an agent that does not believe in the possibility of coming out of autism, the results will likely be negative and would not show a subjective change in the child. I have heard that some children in the experiments discussed here laugh at the mistakes the agent makes. If these behaviors were excluded from the research due to being outside of defined target behavior, we would have omitted the child's clearest behavior as a non-autistic subject. The epistemology of the child with autism should consider the subjectivity that is expression of something unique to every child and every interaction. The science that operates by eliminating the subjective dimension has been referred by Jacques Lacan as making a “forclusion of the subject”. It cannot capture what a child with autism is by using its theoretical and research tools, because subjectivity cannot be standardized and will slide out of the fishing nets used to trap it.
The observations of these videos suggest that the robot and the mediating agent possessing therapeutic training are an effective tool in the cure of autism. For parents and therapists that are resistant to proper psychotherapeutic work or psychoanalysis, the triad agent-robot-child is an appropriate tool.
References
Freud S. (1905) [Freud S., Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905)]. Tres Ensayos de sexualidad Infantil. Obras completas Sigmund Freud, Vol. 7 (sixth ed.). Buenos Aires, Argentina: Amorrortu Ed..
Freud S. (1914) [Freud S., On Narcissism: an Introduction [1914] Introducción al narcisismo. Obras Completas Sigmund Freud, Vol. 14 (sixth ed.). Buenos Aires, Argentina: Amorrortu Ed..
Grosz, P. (2010) Antes de la Interpretación, en dirección de la cura de los trastornos ¨orgánicos¨. In Agrupación Psicoanalítica Lacaniana <>Sigmund Freud Blogspot http://apl-freud.blogspot.com/2011/01/antes-de-la-interpretacion-en-direccion.html, extracted 1-12-2015
Jerusalinsky A. (1977) Psicoanálisis del autismo Buenos Aires Ediciones Nueva Visión
Jerusalinsky A. (2003) Para entender al niño. Claves Psicoanalíticas. Quito: Ed Abya Yala (in http://repository.unm.edu/handle/1928/12189)
Klein, M. (1988). [Klein M. , Envy and Gratitude (1957)], Envidia y gratitud y otros trabajos. Obras completas. Volumen 3 (forth ed.). Barcelona, Spain: Paidós.
Lacan J. (1964) Le Séminarie de Jacques, Livre XI: Les quatre principes fondamentaux del Psychanlyse. Chapitre 4. France: Editions de Seuil.
Lacan, J. (2012) Nota sobre el niño. « Alocución sobre las psicosis del niño » p. 389. En Otros escritos, Buenos Aires: Paidós. (Original work published in 1983).
Robins B., Dautenhahn K. , Dubowsky J. (2006), Does appearance matter in the interaction of children with autism with a humanoid robot? Interaction Studies. John Benjamins Publishing Company. 7:3, 479-512. DOI: 10.1075/is.7.3.16rob
Robins, B., Dickerson, P., Stribling, P., & Dautenhahn, K. (2004). Robot-mediated joint attention in children with autism: A case study in a robot–human interaction. Interaction studies: Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systems 5:2, 161–198
Wainer J., Robins B., Dautenhahn K., Amirabdollahian F. (2013) A pilot study with a novel setup for collaborative play of the humanoid robot KASPAR with children with autism. International Journal of Social Robotics (IJSR), Vol. 6 (1), pp. 45-65.
Winnicot. W.D (1971) Play and Reality, Chap. Transitional Object and Transitional Phenomena. 1-26. Great Britain: Tavistock, Rudlege. (Original work was published in 1951)